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Commercial and Banking Law
by Robert A. Weber, Jr.*
Last year's article1 limited its coverage to cases interpreting provisions of Georgia's Commercial Code.2 Although the courts have
provided ample material to again dedicate the entire survey to that
topic, to do so would ignore other substantive bodies of law that have
had a significant impact on a commercial law practice. Therefore, in
addition to a review of the standard Commercial Code topics (sales,
negotiable instruments and bank collections, and secured transactions),
this year's survey has endeavored to summarize case law and legislative
enactments within the past year in the following categories: banking
and finance, consumer protection, contracts of employment, contract
drafting considerations, and promissory notes. Hopefully, the effort to
include additional subjects has not unduly sacrificed the more comprehensive coverage that fewer topics would allow.
1. BANKING AND FINANCE
A.

Case Law
First Union National Bank of Georgia v. Collins' will have a significant impact on the day-to-day management of banks. The Unclaimed
Property Act 4 provides that funds represented by certain dormant
instruments escheat to the State. Banks withheld service charges prior

* Associate in the firm of Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Macon, Georgia. Mercer
University (BA, 1991; J.D., cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994);
Editor in Chief (1993-1994). Law Clerk to the Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United
States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia (1994-1996). Member, State Bar

of Georgia.
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4.

with last year's Article, many thanks to my wife, Laurie, for all her support.
See Robert A. Weber, Jr., Commercial Law, 48 MERCER L. REV. 167 (1996).
O.C.GA §§ 11-1-101 to 11-12-102 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
221 Ga. App. 442, 471 S.E.2d 892 (1996).
O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 to -235 (1982 & Supp. 1997).
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to the remittance of the funds represented by these instruments to the
State, a practice with which the State disagreed.' When the State
challenged this practice, several banks brought a declaratory judgment
action against the State. The State contended that: (1) the service
charges, imposed by the banks under the authority of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 7-1-358,' can only be levied
against "deposit" accounts, and (2) O.C.G.A. sections 7-1-3727 and 11-31048 precluded service charges against the funds represented by the
instruments.9 The court of appeals disagreed with both of these
positions.
The Department of Banking and Finance Regulation implementing
O.C.G.A. section 7-1-358 "define[d] unpresented certified and official
checks more than two years old to be 'dormant accounts.'"'10 Additionally the legislature had, in adopting the Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act," deleted those provisions that would have prevented banks from
assessing charges on unclaimed official checks. 2 As such, the State's
first contention failed."3
The court of appeals similarly disagreed with the State's second
argument that sections 7-1-372 and 11-3-104 precluded the service
charges in this context.'4 In particular, the court noted the legislature's decision to overrule the attorney general's opinion that section 7-1372 did not permit such service charges. 5 In light of that and other
considerations, the court of appeals upheld banks' contractual and
statutory authority to assess service charges against dormant instruments prior to remittance of the funds they represent to the State."
The court of appeals also issued two decisions during the survey period
that elaborated upon the rights, duties, and obligations incident to joint
tenancy bank accounts. The rule of joint tenancy accounts is that only
clear and convincing evidence can rebut the presumption that amounts
held in a joint account at the death of one joint tenant pass to the

5.

221 Ga. App. at 442, 471 S.E.2d at 893.

6. O.C.GA. § 7-1-358 (1997).
7.

Id § 7-1-372.

8. Id. § 11-3-104 (1994).
9. 221 Ga. App. at 44243, 471 S.E.2d at 893-94.
10. Id. at 443, 471 S.E.2d at 894 (citing GA. COMP. R. & REGs. r. 80-1-8-.01 (1)(c)
(1984)).
11. UNW. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT §§ 4-5, 8B U.L.A. 567 (1993). See O.C.GA. §§ 44-

12-195-96.
12.

221 Ga. App. at 444-45, 471 S.E.2d at 895.

13. Id
14. Id. at 445, 471 S.E.2d at 895.
15.

See id.

16. Id.
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surviving joint tenant(s). 7 In Jordan v. Stephens,' the court of
appeals applied this rule in the context of a defendant who, at the time
he was made a joint tenant with the decedent, held a general power of
attorney over decedent's assets. 9 In affirming the trial court's refusal
to direct a verdict for plaintiffs, who challenged defendant's right to the
funds as surviving joint tenant, the court of appeals found no evidence
that the decedent did not intend for the assets transferred by her to
belong to defendant at her death; "[iun fact, the evidence indicated that
[the decedent] specifically wanted [defendant] to have the assets. .... 20
For precedential purposes, the transfers were proper notwithstanding
the fiduciary relationship that existed between defendant and the
decedent by reason of the power of attorney: "An agent is not absolutely
prohibited from making gifts of the principal's property... ..2
The surviving joint tenant-fiduciary was not as fortunate in Moore v.
Self.22 The surviving joint tenant-defendant, one of three children of
the decedent, held a joint tenancy with the decedent in certain real
property and bank accounts. Prior to her death, the decedent was
declared an incapacitated adult, and defendant petitioned to be
appointed the decedent's guardian. In making her petition, defendant
listed the above-referenced real estate and bank accounts as property of
the ward (decedent) without any indication of defendant's joint tenancy
rights."
The court of appeals first held that the joint tenancy did not terminate
as a matter of law when the decedent was declared an incapacitated
Specifically, the
adult and a guardian was appointed for her.'
appointment of a guardian does not divest a joint tenant of his or her
legal interest in the joint tenancy.25 However, defendant's failure to
indicate her interest as a joint tenant with decedent in her petition to be
appointed guardian violated the "loyalty rule" of guardianship:
A guardian owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his ward and must not
place himself in a position where his individual interests conflict or
may conflict with the interest of the ward .... "[flt is generally, if not
always, humanly impossible for the same person to act fairly in two

17.

O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813 (1997).

18.

221 Ga. App. 8, 470 S.E.2d 733 (1996).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 8, 470 S.E.2d at 734.
Id. at 9, 470 S.E.2d at 735.
Id.
222 Ga. App. 71, 473 S.E.2d 507 (1996).
Id. at 73, 473 S.E.2d at 509.
Id. at 72, 473 S.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 73, 473 S.E.2d at 509.
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capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same transaction.
Consciously or unconsciously he will favor one side as against the
other, where there is or may be a conflict of interest. If one of the
interests involved is that of the [guardian] personally, selfishness is apt
to lead him to give himself an advantage. If permitted to represent
antagonistic interests the [guardian] is placed under temptation and is
apt in many cases to yield to the natural prompting to give himself the
benefit of all doubts.... The principal object of the administration of
the rule is preventative, that is, to make the disobedience of the
[guardian] to the rule so prejudicial to him that he and all other
[guardians] will be induced to keep away from disloyal transactions in
the future ....
It is not necessary that the [guardian] shall have
gained from the transaction, in order to find that [he] is disloyal. If the
dealing presented conflict of interest and consequent temptation to the
[guardian, equity will provide a remedy at the option2of the ward or his
estate] regardless of gain or loss to the [guardian]." 0
Although defendant's violation of the loyalty rule did not terminate the
joint tenancy as a matter of law, defendant was "estopped under
principles of fiduciary law from asserting any claim to the property at
issue as a joint tenancy survivor adverse to [decedent's] estate,
regardless of the legal viability of the joint tenancies and any claim she
would otherwise have had to survivorship rights.' 7
In addition to issues relating to joint tenancy accounts, the court of
appeals addressed issues arising in loan commitments and the monitoring of distressed debtors. In Moore v. Bank of Fitzgerald,8 the terms
of an oral agreement to loan money between plaintiff-borrower and
defendant-bank (as lender) were reduced to writing in a letter, which
stated that its terms superseded "any other verbal agreements made
between the parties."9 The letter memorialized an agreement to loan
money for the purchase of land and to loan "reasonable funds for
[plaintiff's] cattle operation, provided that [plaintiff] can furnish
assurances that cattle feed can be provided and that she can furnish
data establishing the feasibility of payback of such operating loan or
loans, and provided that such operating monies and loans will be
consistent with sound banking practices." 0 The court apparently found
this language too uncertain to be enforceable as a contract to make
future operating loans, stating

26. Id. at 73-74, 473 S.E.2d at 509 (alterations in original) (quoting Dowdy v. Jordan,

128 Ga. App. 200, 205-06, 196 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1973)).
27. Id. at 74, 473 S.E.2d at 510.
28. 225 Ga. App. 122, 483 S.E.2d 135 (1997).

29. Id. at 122, 483 S.E.2d at 137.
30. Id. at 126, 483 S.E.2d at 139 (citations omitted).
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(E]ven if the letter from [defendant] to [plaintiff] is construed as a
written commitment by [defendant] to make future operating loans,
"[u]nless an agreement is reached as to all terms and conditions and
nothing is left to future negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract
in the future [i.e., a loan] is of no effect." 1

The court in Moore also rejected plaintiff's contention that a fiduciary
relationship arose between her and defendant as a result of defendant's
alleged undertaking of management, direction, and control over her
cattle operation. 2 In support of her contention, plaintiff relied on those
provisions of the letter that required her "to meet monthly with a bank
official to 'monitor her farming operations and progress."''
Nevertheless, the court found no evidence in the record to indicate that the
relationship "was so intertwined as to create a fiduciary relationship."'

In particular,
[N]o confidential relationship [exists] between lender and borrower...
[where] they are creditor and debtor with clearly opposite interests
....
[E]ven if the bank had undertaken to advise [plaintiff] on her
[cattle operation] and had [misled] [plaintiff], [plaintiff] would not be

31. Id at 127, 483 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Hartrampf v. C & S Realty Invs., 157 Ga.
App. 879, 881, 278 S.E.2d 750 (1981)).
The court of appeals further held that because the written documents (i.e., the letter) did
not evidence plaintiffs other contention that defendant had an obligation to renew
plaintiffs mortgage loan to permit her to sell part of the secured property to reduce her
debt, such alleged promises were similarly unenforceable. Id. at 126-27,483 S.E.2d at 140.
The court of appeals conclusion in this regard is consistent with its recent treatment of
other loan commitment situations. In GeorgiaFirstBank v. Mathis, 227 Ga. App. 769,490
S.E.2d 439 (1997), the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the plaintiff, who had claimed that the defendant-bank had breached its
obligation to loan money under a loan commitment letter. Id. at 770, 490 S.E.2d at 441.
Pretermitting a decision of whether the letter was an enforceable contract, the court of
appeals in Mathis found the evidence was undisputed that plaintiff had not satisfied the
preconditions contained in the letter. Id. at 770-71, 490 S.E.2d at 441-42. Similarly, the
court of appeals in Moore apparently assumed that the letter was a contract. However, it
does not appear from the decision in Moore that the defendant challenged the letter's
enforceability as a contract.
Based on Moore and Mathis,courts should be wary of forcing banks to loan money under
a loan commitment letter unless aU terms have been reduced to writing and all conditions
precedent have been unquestionably satisfied by the putative borrower.
32. 225 Ga. App. at 126, 483 S.E.2d at 139.
33. Id. at 125-26, 483 S.E.2d at 139.
34. I& at 125, 483 S.E.2d at 139.
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entitled to rely on any such representation but would be "under a duty
to prosecute [her] own inquiries" . ... , as appropriate.5

Legislation
The 1997 session of the Georgia General Assembly enacted numerous
provisions pertaining to the operation and management of banks.
B.

1. Bank Powers and Management. The 1997 General Assembly
significantly expanded the powers granted to banks. Formerly, banks
were limited to exercising, in addition to traditional bank functions
identified by statute, those powers "necessary or convenient" to the
business of banking. 6 The General Assembly replaced the "necessary
and convenient" catchall phrase to provide that banks may now exercise
all powers "incidental" to their business.3 7 More significantly, incidental powers were defined as inclusive of the power to sell insurance
subject to state insurance laws, as well as other powers deemed
"financial in nature" by the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of
By specifically permitting banks to sell
Banking and Finance.3s
insurance products, the General Assembly empowered state-chartered
banks to compete with their federally chartered counterparts who
already enjoyed this power.
The General Assembly also adopted legislation further eroding the
geographic limitations under which banks have traditionally operated.
A bank may now locate its ATMs statewide without the risk of violating
branching laws; that is, ATMs are not considered "bank branches. 8 9
In addition, the General Assembly authorized the Department of
Banking and Finance to require registration of, and to regulate, entities
providing financial services via the Internet. 40 Internet banking, now
in its infancy, promises to be a fertile ground for future regulations.
Presumably in recognition of the reality of interstate banking, the
General Assembly amended residency requirements for bank directors.
Formerly, sixty percent of a bank's directors had to satisfy certain
residency requirements, whereas now only a majority need do so.41 As
to the residency requirement, the law formerly required any director to
reside (1) in Georgia, and (2)(a) either in the county of the bank's

35. Id. at 126,483 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting Pardue v. Bankers First Fed. Sav. Ass'n, 175
Ga. App. 814, 815, 334 S.E.2d 926 (1985)).
36. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-261(10) (1989).
37. Id. § 7-1-261(11) (1997).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 7-1-603(b).
40. Id. § 7-1-61(c)(2).
41. Id. § 7-1-480.
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registered office, or (b) within forty miles of any full service office.42
However, new legislation provides that a bank director may reside
anywhere in Georgia or within forty miles of any office in Georgia, thus
permitting persons in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Tennessee to serve as a director of a Georgia bank.'
Finally, the General Assembly created a new form of financial entity
Presently, the prospect exists
known as a "mutual savings bank."
that Congress will adopt a "master federal charter" that would eliminate
the mutual form of ownership for federally chartered financial institutions. The newly created state-chartered "mutual savings bank" provides
federally chartered institutions with the option of converting to a
"mutual savings bank" if they elect to retain their mutual ownership
form rather than adopt a master federal charter.'
2. Bank Match Registry. The Bank Match Registry legislation,
adopted by the General Assembly in accordance with the requirements
of Congressional welfare reform legislation, is intended to create a
database of bank accounts owned by delinquent child support obliCharged with the responsibility of compiling this list, the
gees.'
Georgia Department of Administrative Services ("DAS") will request
account information on delinquent child support obligees from financial
institutions at which these persons are suspected of maintaining an
account."7 In making the request, DAS must provide the financial
institution with the name, address, social security number, and other
identifying information. Requests may be made no more frequently than
quarterly.'
Upon receipt of such a request, the financial institution has thirty
days to reply to DAS in "machine readable form." 9 If after the
expiration of the thirty-day period no reply has been sent, DAS must
notify the financial institution by certified mail of its obligation to
reply. 0 Failure by the financial institution to reply within fifteen days
of the receipt of this notice subjects the financial institution to a
maximum penalty of one thousand dollars."'

42. Id. § 7-1-480 (1989).
43. Id. § 7-1-480 (1997).
44. Id. § 7-1-293(e).

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. § 19-11-30.1 (Supp. 1997).
Id. § 19-11-30.2.
Id. § 19-11-30.2(b).
Id. § 19-11-30.2(d).
Id. § 19-11-30.5.
Id.
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Other provisions of the Bank Match Registry legislation impose
penalties for financial institutions that warn depositors that a request
has been made,5 2 provide civil immunity for compliance with its
provisions, 3 and permit financial institutions to levy a fee against
funds on deposit prior to remittance to DAS."
The 1997 General Assembly also substantially revised garnishment
procedures regarding property possessed by financial institutions that
is subject to garnishment. After July 1, 1997, any summons of
garnishment served on a financial institution must contain the following:
(1) the name of the defendant, along with all known aliases or combinations or configurations thereof; (2) both the service and current addresses
of the defendant, as well as any other known past addresses; (3)'the
defendant's social security number; and (4) the account numbers known
or suspected by plaintiff to be held by defendant." Attorneys should
verify that their post-judgment discovery forms elicit the foregoing
information.
The form of answer to a summons of garnishment seeking property
held in a safe deposit box has also been revised. The answer to such a
summons must inform the court that the property sought is in a safe
deposit box. Moreover, the financial institution should not pay or
transmit such property to the court at the time of answer. Instead, it
should hold the property until (1) the court issues an order releasing the
garnishment, or requiring delivery, of the safe deposit box's contents, or
(2) 120 days has passed from the date on which the answer is made,
whichever occurs first.'
Numerous provisions now also insulate financial institutions from
liability in the garnishment context. A financial institution is not liable
for failing to answer a summons of garnishment when the plaintiff fails
to provide identification information sufficient to reasonably enable a
financial institution to answer. 7 Nor is a financial institution liable
for freezing assets or paying monies into court if it reasonably believes
the property is that of the defendant and that the action taken with
respect to the property was reasonably required to comply with the
summons of garnishment.5 8 Other provisions protect financial institutions when the property sought to be garnished is held in an association-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 19-11-30.9.
Id.
Id. § 19-11-30.11.
Id. § 18-4-20(i).
Id. § 18-4-84.
Id. § 18-4-92.1(a).
Id § 18-4-92.1(b).
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al or fiduciary account.59 In such cases, the financial institution is not
liable for failing to deliver property from such accounts into court merely
because of the account holder's status as either a principal of an
However, the associational and
associational entity or a fiduciary.'
fiduciary account exemptions from liability are not applicable when the
plaintiff alleges in the summons that use of the account by the principal,
or fiduciary as the case may be, is for an improper purpose such as
hiding assets. 1
3. Miscellaneous. Formerly, the fee that could be charged for a bad
check was twenty dollars; that amount has been increased to twenty-five
dollars.'
Banks, as well as practitioners, should amend any form
letters to reflect this. Although this change will result in increased fees
for banks, the General Assembly eliminated the ability of banks to
charge noncustomers fees for cashing checks drawn on them."
The General Assembly partially reversed a line of court decisions that
held the transferee of a security deed with an open-end provision cannot
have the benefit of the security under the deed from prior indebtedness
or for additional advances to the maker." Now, a transferee or
assignee of a "home equity line" who makes additional advances or
disbursements shall have the benefit of the security under the deed if
post-assignment disbursements were authorized by the original
parties.6
Lastly, the General Assembly ameliorated the harsh effects that befall
a foreclosing party upon post-foreclosure discovery that intangible tax
had not been paid on the foreclosed instrument." Formerly, a foreclosing party was subject to an action for wrongful foreclosure for foreclosing
on an instrument on which the required intangible tax had not been
paid. Now, if the intangible tax has not been paid prior to foreclosure,
and as a result the deed from foreclosure is deemed unperfected, such a
deed may be perfected by payment of (1) the required tax, (2) interest
from the time the tax was due, and (3) a penalty equal to fifty percent
of the tax. 7

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
Willis,
65.

Id. § 18-4-92,1(cX2).
Id. § 18-4-92.1(c2)(A)-(B).
Id. § 18-4-92.1(c)(2).
Id. § 13-6-15(b),
Id. § 7-1-239.5 (1997).
See, e.g., Willis v. Rabun Cty. Bank, 249 Ga. 493, 291 S.E.2d 715 (1982); FDIC v.
497 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-1(c) (Supp. 1997).

66. Id. § 48-6-77.

67. Id.
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COMMERCIAL CODE

A.

Sales
The rules regarding passage of title under Article 2 provided the rule
for decision in Clark v.Messer Industries." In Clark, plaintiff had
contracted with defendant-carrier to deliver goods to plaintiff's customer,
and the parties had agreed among themselves that plaintiff was
responsible for payment of the freight charges. Because of the customer's nonpayment to defendant-carrier in prior unrelated transactions,
defendant withheld from the customer plaintiff's goods that were in its
possession.6 9
In plaintiff's suit for recovery of the goods held by defendant,
defendant contended that because the reverse side of the shipping form
stated "FOB Shipping Point," title to the goods passed to the customer
when accepted by the defendant for shipment. Under section 11-2-319,
the term "FOB place of shipment" means that at the place of shipment,
the seller must place the goods with a carrier and bear the risk of
transportation unless otherwise agreed. However, when the seller is
responsible for payment of the shipping costs, title passes to the buyer
on tender at the destination. Because of the agreement among the
parties that seller was responsible for payment of shipping costs, it had
been "otherwise agreed," and the parties had altered the operation of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") provision. 0
Two survey period decisions addressed the question of whether notice
given under O.C.G.A. section 11-2-60771 was reasonable. Section 11-2607, which prescribes the effect of acceptance, obligates a buyer to "pay
at the contract rate for any goods accepted," and once accepted, the goods
may not be rejected.7 Although acceptance does not "impair any other
remedy provided by [Article 21 for nonconformity,"78 section 11-2-607
does impose a prerequisite for recovery on the basis of accepted,
nonconforming goods. In particular, when a tender has been accepted
by a buyer, the buyer "must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered74any breach notify the seller of breach or be
barred from any remedy."

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74,

222 Ga. App. 606, 475 S.E.2d 653 (1996).
Id. at 606-07, 475 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 607, 475 S.E.2d at 654-55.
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-607 (1994).
Id. § 11-2-607(1)-(2).
Id.§ 11-2-607(2).
Id. § 11-2-607(3)(a).

19971

COMMERCIAL & BANKING LAW

105

In Great Western Press,Inc. v. Atlanta Film Converting Co.,"' a seller
produced wrappers for a buyer who in turn distributed the wrappers to
its customer through a contract with a third party. The buyer ordered
a specific quantity of wrappers from the seller on June 8, and the seller
began delivery on June 22, with the entire shipment arriving by June
24. The wrappers were delivered to the customer on June 27, and the
customer notified the third party on June 30 of defects in the wrappers.
The customer cured this defect at its own expense. The customer passed
the charge for the cure on to the third party, who in turn passed the cost
to buyer. On August 4, the buyer informed the seller that it would not
be paid, and the seller made a demand for payment on September 8.
The seller sued, and the buyer counterclaimed for breach of warranty.7
On appeal from the trial court's decision granting plaintiff-seller
summary judgment on defendant-buyer's counterclaim for breach of
warranty, defendant argued that material questions of fact remained as
to whether its notice to plaintiff-seller on August 4 was reasonable under
O.C.G.A. section 11-2-607(3). Plaintiff argued that the trial court was
correct in finding that defendant's notice on August 4 was not, as a
matter of law, reasonable under section 11-2-607. Defendant countered
that because the time for performance had expired at the time the goods
were delivered, plaintiff had no right to cure under O.C.G.A. section 112-508. 77 The court of appeals agreed with defendant, noting that
plaintiff had no right to cure even if notice had been given and that time
was of the essence. 8
For precedential purposes, Great Western Press erroneously suggests
that the availability of the seller's right to cure under O.C.G.A. section
11-2-508 was a factor to consider in determining whether notice provided
under O.C.G.A. section 11-2-607(3) was reasonable. The right of cure
79
provided in section 11-2-508 exists where goods have been rejected;
however, the notice provided under section 11-2-607 is required only
where goods have been accepted.' Indeed, where notice is required
under section 11-2-607, the right to cure under section 11-2-508 will
never exist.
The court of appeals also addressed the notice required by section 112-607 in Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co."' On December 7, 1992,

75. 223 Ga. App. 861, 479 S.E.2d 143 (1996).
76. Id. at 862, 479 S.E.2d at 144.
77. Id. at 863, 479 S.E.2d at 145.

78. Id.
79.
80.
81.

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-508(1) (1994).
Id. § 11-2-607.
226 Ga. App. 50, 485 S.E.2d 217 (1997).
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defendant-retailer placed its first order for bedding with plaintiffmanufacturer, followed by several more. However, in September 1993,
plaintiff became concerned with the amount of defendant's unpaid
balance, and on October 13, 1993, the parties redefined their relationship: defendant would pay for goods on delivery and make additional
payments against the unpaid balance. Because of plaintiff's dissatisfaction with defendant's payments thereafter, plaintiff terminated the
account on November 5, 1993, repossessed the merchandise then in
possession of defendant, and credited defendant's account in the amount
of the repossessed merchandise, leaving an unpaid balance for which
plaintiff sued. On November 11, 1993, defendant sent a letter through
counsel to plaintiff stating that if plaintiff sued, defendant would
counterclaim for breach of warranty for defects in goods dating from
December 1992, and that the letter was intended to serve as notice
under section 11-2-607(3).82
The court of appeals first ruled that the notice sent by letter on
November 11, 1993 was untimely as a matter of law because "[written
notice sent only after the relationship has been terminated and all goods
either sold or retrieved by the seller does not and cannot serve the
purposes of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-607(3)(a). Notice on November 11 did not
permit [plaintiff-seller] to inspect or cure the already sold merchandise."88 However, defendant's evidence that during the course of the
relationship he had complained "'over and over'" and "'on a regular basis'" to plaintiff about the quality of merchandise demonstrated a
genuine issue of material fact on whether the section 11-2-607 notice had
been given." Moreover, the trial court erred by requiring the section
11-2-607 notice to be written or have a specific content." Rather, the
notice must merely be sufficient to inform the seller that "the transaction was still troublesome and must be watched." 6
Generally, a seller who discovers that a buyer was insolvent while
receiving goods on credit may reclaim those goods "upon demand made
within [ten] days after the receipt" thereof.8 7 In Eastman Cutting
Room Sales Corp. v. Ottenheimer & Co, the determinative issue was
the moment at which "receipt" had occurred. 9 Plaintiff had begun

82. Id. at 51, 485 S.E.2d at 218-19.
83. Id. at 53, 485 S.E.2d at 220.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id, (citing Oden & Sims Used Cars v. Thurmond, 165 Ga. App. 500, 500-01, 301
S.E.2d 673, 674 (1983)).
87. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-702 (1994).

88. 221 Ga. App. 659, 472 S.E.2d 494 (1996).
89. Id. at 659, 472 S.E.2d at 495.
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delivery of equipment under a contract of sale with defendant-buyer in
February 1995, and the last delivery of equipment was made May 26,
1995. The contract between the parties further provided for plaintiff to
install the equipment after delivery, and plaintiff fully installed the
equipment by June 28, 1995. Plaintiff learned of defendant's insolvency
for the first time on June 28, 1995 and made demand under section 11-2702 for reclamation of the goods on July 2, 1995. 90 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the July 2 notice was untimely
under the statute because all equipment had been received on or before
May 26, 1995.91 Notwithstanding that the equipment remained to be
installed after delivery was completed on May 26, 1995, it was in the
physical possession of the defendant, and this was dispositive of the
issue.92
The court of appeals also addressed the proper elements of a purchaser's damages under Article 2. In Latex Equipment Sales & Service, Inc.
v. Apache Mills, Inc.,"' plaintiff had contracted with defendant to
design, build, and install a unique piece of machinery. One third of the
purchase price was to be paid on the date of contract, a second third on
shipment, and a final third within thirty days after shipment. After
plaintiff made the first payment, defendant failed to make timely
delivery of the machine. More than seven months after the time for
delivery had passed, defendant told plaintiff that the machine was
ready, but that the balance of the purchase price would be required upon
delivery because of plaintiff's default in paying for other equipment
under unrelated contracts. Plaintiff sued defendant and in the
meantime attempted to find a replacement for the machine for which it
had contracted with defendant.94
Most notably, the court of appeals ruled that increased operating
expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of defendant's breach qualified
as incidental damages under section 11-2-715."' The evidence showed
that plaintiff had incurred additional labor and inventory costs as a
result of defendant's failure to deliver the machine, that the costs were
reasonable, and that they were incurred as a result of the defendant's
conduct." Although no Georgia case had decided whether labor costs
are a proper element of incidental damages, the court found that

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
1
See id. at 660, 472 S.E.2d at 495.
225 Ga. App. 516, 484 S.E.2d 274 (1997).
Id. at 516-17, 484 S.E.2d at 275-76.
Id. at 518-19, 484 S.E.2d at 276-77.
Id. at 518, 484 S.E.2d at 277.
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awarding damages for operating costs made the damaged party whole
and was consistent with UCC policy."'
Moreover, the increased operating expenses incurred by plaintiff
qualified as consequential damages because they were foreseeable by
defendant, whose employees had visited plaintiff's plant prior to
contracting for the design of the machinery.9" Nor could plaintiff have
mitigated the increased operating expenses. The evidence showed that
plaintiff had attempted unsuccessfully to find a replacement machine
and that even if plaintiff had paid the purchase price as demanded, it
would nevertheless have incurred damages because defendant was no
longer promising to install the machinery or provide the software
necessary to its operation." Finally, "evidence of the market price of
a similar, though less desirable, machine" was sufficient to support an
award of damages under section 11-2-713, which requires proof of
market price, because the item contracted for was unique.'Oo
The survey period decision that promises to be the most discussed and
cited is NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson,"0 ' in which the Georgia
Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the law of unconscionability. In
Nelson, plaintiffs had purchased a television set from defendant.
Plaintiffs alleged that a defect in the television had caused a fire that
destroyed their home and sued defendant on the basis of strict liability,
negligence, and breach of warranty. The trial court granted partial
summary judgment to the defendant on the basis of a warranty
exclusion, which limited consequential damages for breach of warranty
to the cost of repair and replacement. In so ruling, the trial court
rejected plaintiffs' contention that such an exclusion was unconscionable
as a matter of law."° The court of appeals reversed, finding that a
jury question existed on the issue of unconscionability of this warranty
exclusion."0 3 The supreme court granted certiorari on the question of
whether the consequential damages limitation
was unconscionable as a
14
matter of law under these circumstances. 0
The supreme court began its analysis by citing the basic test for
determining unconscionability: "'[Wihether, in light of the general

97. Id. at 517-18, 484 S.E.2d at 276.
98. Id. at 518, 484 S.E.2d at 276.
99. Id., 484 S.E.2d at 277.

100. Id. at 519, 484 S.E.2d at 277.
101. 267 Ga. 390, 478 S.E.2d 769 (1996).
102.

Id. at 390, 478 S.E.2d at 770-71.

103. Id. (citing Nelson v. C.M. City, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 850,463 S.E.2d 902 (1995)); see
also Robert A. Weber, Jr., Commercial Law, 48 MERCER L. REv. 167, 176-78 (1996)
(discussing court of appeals decision).
104. 267 Ga. at 390, 478 S.E.2d at 771.
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commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
trader case, the clauses involved are so one sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
0
contract.'"0'
In applying this test, the court found it helpful to rely
upon the distinction between the procedural and substantive elements
of unconscionability.106 Procedural unconscionability refers to the
process of making the contract and is determined by reference to the age,
education, intelligence, business acumen, experience, and relative
bargaining power of the parties; the conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the contract; any oppressiveness; and the presence of meaningful
choice. 0 7 By contrast, substantive unconscionability refers to the
contract terms per se and requires courts to consider commercial
reasonableness, purpose and effect, allocation of risk, and public
policy."10 Whether procedural and substantive unconscionability must
both 9exist for a court to invalidate a contract was left for another
day.'1

Applying the foregoing principles, the court found no procedural
unconscionability because the language was conspicuous and comprehensible; the warranty advised plaintiffs of their rights and provided them
with a phone number to contact if they had any questions; plaintiffs
were able to bargain on certain matters within the contract; and the
evidence showed that the scope of warranty protection played no part in
plaintiffs' decision to purchase the television set." Nor did the court
find any substantive unconscionability, which must exist at the time of
contract. " In particular, there was no evidence that plaintiffs were
unaware of the hazards associated with electrical appliances generally,
nor was there evidence of knowledge of this particular danger by the
defendant." 2 Because the court could not conclude "as a matter of law
that decent, fairminded persons would possess a profound sense of
injustice from the enforcement of this warranty provision excluding the
recovery of consequential property damages in the sale of a television
set," the exclusion was not unconscionable as a matter of law."

105. Id. at 391, 478 S.E.2d at 771 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989)).
106. Id. at 391-92, 478 S.E.2d at 771.
107. Id. at 392, 478 S.E.2d at 771-72.

108.
109.
110.
111.
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113.

Id., 478 S.E.2d at 772.
Id. at 394 n.6, 478 S.E.2d at 773 n.6.
Id. at 393-94, 478 S.E.2d at 772-73.
Id. at 394-95, 478 S.E.2d at 773.
Id. at 395-96, 478 S.E.2d at 773-74.
Id. at 396, 478 S.E.2d at 775.
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Lastly under Article 2, the court of appeals ruled in Topeka Machinery
Exchange, Inc. v. Stoler Industries,Inc.114 that evidence of usage in the
trade-in this case, that warranties in the particular trade were
implicitly limited to providing parts and labor sufficient to bring an item
into compliance with satisfactory standards of performance and, if
unsuccessful, to return the item and refund the purchase price-was
admissible by way of parol evidence to explain or supplement the
warranty sued upon."5 The court did not indicate whether the
warranty was implied or one expressly contained in a contract between
the parties.
B. Negotiable Instruments and Bank Collections
Most survey decisions dealing with Article 3 applied prerevision
Article 3 in resolving issues. Whether and to what extent the courts will
accord these interpretations of prerevision Article 3 precedential value
remains to be seen. The court in Union Planters National Bank v.
Crook" 6 analyzed real defenses to an action for enforcement by a
holder in due course. In Crook, defendant had written three checks on
December 9, 1993 drawn on a bank in Alabama and payable to a truck
dealership. Defendant gave the checks to the dealership to hold as a
deposit for the purchase of trucks until financing could be arranged.
Consistent with this understanding, the following notation appeared on
the checks' memo lines: "91 Flt.Trk, to be held for fina[nlce app[roval]." 1 17 Contradicting its agreement with defendant, the dealership
deposited the checks with plaintiff-bank in the dealership's account on
December 10, 1993. When defendant called the dealership to inform it
that financing had been arranged, defendant learned that the checks had
been deposited and immediately placed a stop payment order with the
drawee bank. On December 13, 1993, the dealership filed bankruptcy
and plaintiff-bank was inundated with stop payments on checks
deposited into the dealership's account. On December 11, 1993, plaintiff
received notice of dishonor of defendant's checks. On December 16,
1993, defendant signed a promissory note with the financier, who wired
the funds to the dealership, and defendant took delivery of the truck. In
the dealership's bankruptcy, a dispute arose between plaintiff bank and
another of the dealership's creditors but was settled after dismissal of
the bankruptcy petition. Under the settlement, plaintiff assigned to the

114.
115.
116.
117.

220 Ga. App. 799, 470 S.E.2d 250 (1996).
Id at 799, 470 S.E.2d at 251.
225 Ga. App. 578, 484 S.E.2d 327 (1997).
Id. at 579, 484 S.E.2d at 329 (alterations in original).
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creditor "all accounts, contract rights, and accounts receivable then
owned or thereafter in existence, and all proceeds of the same.""'
Although plaintiff-bank was a holder in due course, a jury was
authorized to conclude that there had been "[sluch misrepresentation as
[had] induced the party [defendant] to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms.""9 In particular, a jury could conclude that acceptance and deposit by the dealership was theft by
deception and a RICO violation. 20
Contrasted with this rather broad interpretation of the "real defense"
121
of illegality is the decision in Southtrust Bank of Georgia v. Parker.
Defendants, husband and wife, were cohabitating in a home when the
husband signed an installment agreement and note for installation of
siding. The note was assigned for value to plaintiff as a holder in due
course. The husband and wife then separated, and the wife continued
to live in the home. When payments were not made, plaintiff sued the
husband and wife as codefendants. Defendant-wife answered admitting
that the husband had signed her name but denied she consented to her
name being signed, cross-claimed against the husband, and filed a third
party complaint against the siding contractor. The trial court granted
defendant-wife's motion for summary22 judgment on the basis that her
signature on the note was a forgery.
The court of appeals reversed. Because plaintiff was a holder in due
course, it was incumbent upon defendant-wife to establish the real
defense of fraud in factum, that is, that her signature had in fact been
forged and unauthorized by her."2 However, the law implies that the
signature was authorized as funds were spent for improvement of the
home and marital relationship.'2 4 If defendant-wife successfully
rebutted that implication, defendant-wife could nevertheless be deemed
to have ratified the signature by accepting the benefit of the work.'2
Even if defendant-wife succeeded in proving that the signature had been
forged, unauthorized, and unratified, the plaintiff would still be entitled
to have 2a6 jury decide whether the wife's negligence contributed to the
forgery.
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119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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126.

Id. at 579-81, 484 S.E.2d at 328-31.
Id. at 581, 484 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-3-305(2Xc) (1994)).
Id. at 582, 484 S.E.2d at 331.
226 Ga. App. 292, 486 S.E.2d 402 (1997).
Id. at 292-93, 486 S.E.2d at 404.
Id. at 294, 486 S.E.2d at 405.
Id.
Id. at 295, 486 S.E.2d at 406.
Id.
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At issue in Peavy v. Bank South127 was the question of liability for
conversion of an instrument. An insurance company, as drawer, issued
a check drawn on defendant-bank to plaintifs son and Trust Company
Bank as joint payees. Because plaintiff's son did not have an account
with defendant, plaintiff allowed the son to deposit the check to his
account at defendant-bank. When the son deposited the check with
defendant-bank on December 29, 1992, he was the only endorser.
Plaintiff drew against the deposited funds, and on March 30, 1993,
defendant notified plaintiff of the improper deposit (the co-payee's
endorsement had not been obtained), debited plaintiff's account in the
amount of the check, and credited the account of the drawer-insurer.
Defendant contacted plaintiff requesting that he deposit funds to cover
the check. Plaintiff sued defendant-bank seeking recovery of the amount
he had been required to pay into the account plus recovery for conversion and tortious coercion, damages, and attorney fees. Defendant-bank
responded that the charge back was permitted under the terms of the
deposit contract and under the terms of Article 4, which governs the
relationship between banks and their depositors. 2 '
The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's conversion theory on the
ground that defendant's action plainly did not qualify as a conversion-defendant had not refused to return the instrument to plaintiff."2 Further, plaintiff could not allege a cause of action under
section 11-4-207 for breach of warranty, as he did not qualify as an
"other payor" for purposes of that code section."3 0 However, the court
of appeals did find that jury questions remained regarding whether
defendant's actions were timely and in good faith, notwithstanding that
plaintiff had consented to the bank's right of setoff in the deposit
agreement.' 3 ' Additionally, a jury question remained as to the propriety of the bank's actions in asserting its contract rights.'3 2 In the
court's opinion, the record did not establish that the bank acted with "all
commercially reasonable due diligence and dispatch, in discovering the
irregularity, or that it acted evenhandedly as between its two customers,
plaintiffs on the one hand and [the insurance company] on the other, in
addressing the error.""3 3 The court of appeals decision on this last
point is dangerously broad. It erroneously implies that a customer has
a cause of action against a bank when the bank prefers one customer
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

222 Ga. App. 501, 474 S.E.2d 690 (1996).
id. at 501-03, 474 S.E.2d at 691-93.
Id. at 504, 474 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 504-05, 474 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 506-06, 474 S.E.2d at 694-95.
Id.
Id., 474 S.E.2d at 694 (emphasis omitted).
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over another. Certainly, the court of appeals did not intend to suggest
that a bank may not, consistent with the terms and conditions of an
account agreement, prefer one customer over another without subjecting
itself to liability.
C. Letters of Credit
The court of appeals in Vass v. Gainesville Bank & Trust"s elaborated on the duties and obligations of the issuer of a letter of credit under
Article 5 of the UCC. In Vass, defendant had issued a letter of credit to
plaintiff to insure payment of bond claims by All American Bonding.
The procedure for making payment requests under the letter was to
present the claim on or before April 18, 1994, "but subject to a claim
made [o]ccuring prior to that date unless the letter of credit is cancelled
by the Sheriff of Hall County.'""" After All American refused plaintiffs demand for payment, plaintiff on April 18, 1994 requested payment
by defendant, stating in writing that "'attached invoices have been
presented to All American Bonding for payment and payment has been
refused by All American Bonding Company.'"'
The court held that defendant-bank, as issuer of the letter of credit,
had a duty to carefully examine the documents presented to it and the
request made by plaintiff "so as to ascertain that on their face they
appear to comply with the terms of the credit letter." 7 Nevertheless,
plaintiff's failure to specify in the demand that the invoices had been
presented and were unpaid thirty days after such presentation was not
a "minor deviation from the conditions precedent for payment according
to the letter of credit," and as such absolved defendant of its obligation
to pay according to the letter of credit."s Any ambiguity in the letter
of credit was to be resolved by reference to standard contract interpretation principles. 3 9
D.

Secured Transactions
In Paulsen Street Investors v. Ebco General Agencies,"4 the court of
appeals decided an issue of first impression in Georgia regarding the
scope of Article 9 in the context of insurance premium financing
arrangements. In Paulsen, plaintiff advanced money to defendant to

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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224 Ga. App. 259, 480 S.E.2d 294 (1997).
Id. at 259, 480 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 259-60, 480 S.E.2d at 295-96.
Id. at 261, 480 S.E.2d at 296.
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finance automobile insurance premiums. The insurance policies were
written by a separate entity and purchased from various insurance
companies. Plaintiff had a written security agreement with defendant
under which plaintiff was granted a security interest in all accounts
receivable, a term inclusive of any right by defendant to receive money
as a result of policy cancellation and the return of any unused portion
of any premium. Defendant had an agreement with each insured
defining the scope of the right to receive unused portions of the
premiums in addition to certain fees and penalties to which defendant
was entitled upon cancellation of the policy. On November 9, 1990,
plaintiff filed a financing statement on a UCC-1 covering all such
accounts receivable of defendant. When defendant defaulted under the
terms of the security agreement, plaintiff sought to recover against these
receivables under the provisions of Article 9. The trial court granted
defendant's summary judgment motion on the basis that plaintiff's
security interest in accounts receivable under Article 9 did not include
the "unearned insurance premiums.""' Following the lead established
by other jurisdictions, the court of appeals held that section 11-9-104
excluded from the coverage of Article 9 "insurance and returned or
Accordingly, Article 9 did not
unearned insurance premiums.""
apply.'
The court of appeals elaborated on the election of remedies by a
secured party post-foreclosure in Oraka v. Jaraysi.'" In Oraka,
defendant purchased a gas station from plaintiff, and plaintiff agreed to
allocate $820,000 of the purchase price to improved realty and $80,000
to personalty. After closing the purchase on July 16, 1994, defendant
learned that plaintiff had, the day before signing the purchase agreement, initiated an action for specific performance on a lease involving
the same realty purportedly sold to defendant. Upon learning of this,
defendant sought to rescind and plaintiff refused. When defendant
failed to make payment on the notes given as part of the purchase price,
plaintiff sued to foreclose on the deed to secure debt securing the notes
on May 2, 1995. At the foreclosure sale, plaintiff bid $600,000 on the
real property, notwithstanding the contractually assigned value of
$820,000, thereby establishing a deficiency. The $600,000 paid at
foreclosure was subsequently found to be the fair market value upon
confirmation, notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of damage to the
property or of a depressed real estate market. On December 21, 1994,

141.
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143.
144.

Id. at 507-08, 481 S.E.2d at 247-48.
Id. at 509, 481 S.E.2d at 248-49.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 310; 486 S.E.2d 69 (1997).
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plaintiff gave notice under section 11-9-503 of its intent to repossess all
equipment and business assets, and stated that plaintiff would credit the
same against its contractually assigned value of $80,000, notwithstanding that in plaintiff's separate suit for specific performance, such assets
were valued at $130,000 by plaintiff. Defendant appealed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, contending that
plaintiff's suit for the deficiency was barred by his election to retain the
collateral repossessed under section 11-9-505(2).'4
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that Georgia follows
a strict foreclosure rule. When a creditor takes possession of secured
property, he does so pending (a) a commercially reasonable resale, or (b)
an election to retain the collateral under section 11-9-505.'4 However,
taking possession does not imply an election under section 11-9-505
absent written notice of intent to do so. 47 In this case, plaintiff's
written notice of repossession, of his intent not to resell the collateral,
and of his intent to keep such property constituted a written election
that satisfied the requirements of section 11-9-505(2).'4
III.

CONSUMER PROTECTION

As noted previously in this Article, NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson
adopted a method for assessing consumer unconscionability claims in the
context of a warranty disclaimer. 49 Although decided under the UCC,
that test would apparently apply as well to consumer contexts in which
the UCC does not supply the substantive rule of law." ° Besides
Nelson, the court issued several decisions dealing with the Fair Business
52
5
Practices Act ("FBPA"),' 1 the Health Care Records Act ("HCRA"),
and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").6 8
A.

FairBusiness PracticesAct

Two survey period decisions addressed the scope of the FBPA. In
the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Friedlander v. PDK Labs, Inc.,
Appeals certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court:

145. Id. at 310-11, 486 S.E.2d at 69-70.
146. Id. at 311-12, 486 S.E.2d at 70.
147. Id. at 312, 486 S.E.2d at 70.

148. Id. at 313, 486 S.E.2d at 71.
149. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Garbutt v. Southern Clays, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
151. O.C.GA. §§ 10-1-392, -407 (1994 & Supp. 1997).

152. Id. §§ 31-33-2, -3 (1996).
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1982 & Supp. 1997).
154. 266 Ga. 180, 465 S.E.2d 670 (1996).
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"Do non-consumers have a cause of action under the FBPA when they
allege an injury due to a competitor's misrepresentations to the general
Plaintiff, the developer of a patented diet
consuming public?"1"
control drug that had not yet received approval from the FDA, sued
defendant, which marketed its own diet control products, in state court.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant's failure to disclose that its
products were untested and lacking governmental approval constituted
an unfair and deceptive practice under the FBPA. The foregoing
was certified after removal of the case to federal district
question
1
court. 5

The supreme court answered the question in the negative.'5 7
Because a "suit predicated upon an alleged violation of the FBPA must
be brought in the plaintiff's 'capacity as an individual member of the
consuming public,'" plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action.'"
Specifically, the court found that "[a] suit is not brought in the capacity
of an individual member of the consuming public when the plaintiff's
only allegation of an injurious consumer act or practice relates to
marketing of competing
representations made by his competitor in 1the
69
products to the general consuming public."
The second decision addressing the scope of the FBPA similarly
limited its coverage. In Robin v. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing
Co.,"6 plaintiff-attorney contracted with defendant for an advertisement in the yellow pages. For an additional fee, advertisers such as
plaintiff would be listed in "real consumer tips," a display located among
the various advertisements for attorneys. Upon calling the number
provided in the "real consumer tips" section, consumers would hear
advertisements for attorneys subscribing to that service. Plaintiff
claimed that "because the attorney advertisements included in the
'consumer tips' messages do not reveal that attorneys paid for the ads,
[defendant] creates the impression that the featured attorneys are more
qualified or that [defendant] endorses them." 61 The court of appeals
confirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim. 62 Specifically, defendant was exempt from the
FBPA "pursuant to O.C.G.A. [section] 10-1-396(2) because the allegedly

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Friedlander v. PDK Labs, 59 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 1995).
266 Ga. at 180, 465 S.E.2d at 670-71.
Id. at 181, 465 S.E.2d at 671.
Id
Id
221 Ga. App. 360, 471 S.E.2d 294 (1996).
Id. at 360, 471 S.E.2d at 295.
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improper acts were committed in the course of its business as the
publisher of an advertising periodical."1
In addition to FBPA coverage issues, the court also addressed the
validity of claims admittedly within the Act's coverage. Both decisions
involved claims made in the context of car dealerships, a favorite target
of FBPA plaintiffs. A claim under the FBPA consists of three elements:
"a violation of the Act, causation, and injury"'" Further, a plaintiff
need not establish "knowledge of the deception and intent to deceive" on
behalf of the defendant."
In Crown Ford, Inc. v. Crawford,' the
court dealt with the first and second of these three elements. Plaintiff,
a used car buyer, alleged that defendant violated the FBPA by misrepresenting the vehicle's actual mileage. Defendant furnished plaintiff with
an odometer disclosure form containing an unmarked box that, had it
been checked, would have indicated the vehicle's odometer did not reflect
actual mileage. Although the purchase order indicated the same milefge
as the disclosure form provided plaintiff, defendant remitted its copy of
the disclosure form to the state with the box checked, thereby indicating
the car's odometer did not reflect actual mileage. Moreover, defendant
had received from the prior owner an odometer disclosure form
indicating that the odometer had been replaced and that the actual
mileage
was greater than indicated on the vehicle's current odome67
ter.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on defendant's
liability on the FBPA claim, the court of appeals found there was no
question of material fact regarding the existence of a violation of the Act:
"[defendant] violated the FBPA because it had ample reason to know it1
had misrepresented to [plaintiff] the actual mileage on the [vehicle]."'
The court of appeals premised its holding on the fact that the defendant
had "reasonable notice" of the odometer discrepancy and failed to take
"reasonable measures" to uncover the actual state of affairs.6 9
Further, the court found that defendant had produced no evidence to
rebut plaintiff's proof of causation as established by her verified
complaint that she had "justifiably relied" on defendant's representations.' 70
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Id., 471 S.E.2d at 295.
Regency Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 645,647,391 S.E.2d 467,470 (1990).
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221 Ga. App. 881, 473 S.E.2d 554 (1996).
Id. at 881-82, 473 S.E.2d at 555-56.
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The car dealership in Garcia v. Charles Evans BMW, Inc."" fared
better than its counterpart in Crown Ford. In Garcia plaintiff, a car
lessor, entered negotiations with defendant for the lease of a new
automobile. During the course of negotiations, plaintiff incorrectly
assumed the method by which sales tax would be calculated and on the
basis of this assumption entered into a lease agreement. Plaintiff sued
on the basis of, inter alia, the FBPA, alleging misrepresentations by
defendant regarding sales tax calculation. 172 The court of appeals
affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant on the FBPA claim,
citing the merger clause in the lease agreement, which stated: "'[there
are no other promises or understandings between the parties concerning
this lease.'"'7 8 Because no evidence showed plaintiff was prevented
from reading the contract, plaintiff could not establish the "justifiable
reliance" that is essential to proving causation under an FBPA
174

cOaiM

B. Health Care Records Act
Under the HCRA, a provider "having custody and control of the
patient's records is required to furnish a copy of that record to that
patient or to any other person or provider designated by the patient"
upon written request from the patient. 75 The party making the
request is responsible for "reasonable costs for copying and mailing the
patient's records. 76
In Cotton v. Med-Cor Health Information Solutions, Inc.,' 7 providerhospital had contracted with defendant to provide copying services.
Defendant complied with a request made by plaintiff for copies of records
in possession of the provider and charged plaintiff between $1.06 and
$7.60 per page. 7" Defendant contended that it was not a "provider"
for purposes of the HCRA. Eschewing a plain language reading of the
HCRA, the court of appeals disagreed, holding that the legislative intent
of insuring patient access to medical records without excessive charges
therefor "would be completely defeated through a construction of the Act
that would allow patients to be charged more than the reasonable
copying and mailing cost if the providers hire others to perform the task

171. 222 Ga. App. 121, 473 S.E.2d 588 (1996).
172.
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Id. at 121-22, 473 S.E.2d at 588-89.
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O.C.GA. § 31-33-2(a)-(b) (1996).
Id. § 31-33.3(a).
221 Ga. App. 609, 472 S.E.2d 92 (1996).
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of supplying the records."179 Although the majority opinion by the
court of appeals did not address the question, a special concurrence
noted that "the defendant's copying charges were unreasonable."" s
C.

Federal FairDebt Collection PracticesAct
Although a federal law, the FDCPA provides a cause of action that
may be enforced in state courts. Under the FDCPA, a debt collector181
may not, inter alia, use any false or misleading representation in the
8
collection of a consumer debt."
Once a debt collector has notified the
consumer of the debt, the consumer may respond by disputing the
debt.'
If disputed, the debt collector must respond by sending the
consumer verification of the debt.'
In Vidrine v. American Professional Credit, Inc.,"s defendant-debt collector sent plaintiff a dunning
letter, and plaintiff responded by disputing the debt. Defendant sent
plaintiff verification of the debt and thereafter closed its collection file
on plaintiff. However, evidence showed that after the file was closed,
defendant had furnished several credit bureaus with information
concerning the debt without indicating that it was disputed by plaintiff.s8 Plaintiff claimed that defendant violated the FDCPA by failing
to indicate in its communication with credit bureaus the fact that the
debt was disputed. Section 1692e(8), which states that a debt collector
makes a false or misleading representation by "[clommunicating... to
any person credit information which is known or which should be known
to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is
disputed," supported plaintiff's claim."8 7 The court of appeals agreed
with plaintiff that evidence of defendant's failure to indicate the debt's
disputed nature and its communication to credit bureaus created a
question for the jury"' s
However, the more significant aspect of the decision in Vidrine was
the court of appeals ruling on the permissible elements of plaintiff's

179. Id. at 611, 472 S.E.2d at 95.
180. d. at 613, 472 S.E.2d at 97 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
181. "Debt collector" is a statutorily defined term that includes attorneys who regularly
engage in consumer debt collection litigation on behalf of creditor clients. Heintz v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995); see also Schimmel v. Slaughter, 975 F. Supp. 1481 (M.D.
Ga. 1997).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (Supp. 1997).
183. Id. § 1692g.
184. Id.
185. 223 Ga. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 602 (1996).
186. Id. at 358, 477 S.E.2d at 603-04.
187. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 604.
188. Id.
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damages under the FDCPA. Although the court of appeals found that
plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress
under her state-based intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
such damages were a proper element of actual damages under the
FDCPA. 189 Thus, plaintiff was "entitled to seek damages for emotional
distress caused by [defendant's] alleged FDCPA violation, without
proving the elements of the state law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress."1
IV.

PROMISSORY NOTES AND GUARANTY

Apart from being used as a form of payment in commercial dealings,
the promissory note is an effective means to establish liability in a sum
certain between parties and thereby eliminate any complaints one might
have about the other's performance under a prior contractual arrangement. Thus, "[diefects, if any, in a [maker's] prior contractual obligations [are] cured ...

by signing the promissory notes."191 The survey

period produced several decisions in the promissory note context on such
issues as admissibility of parol evidence to explain the terms of the note,
authority to give a note, liability for attorney fees under the terms of a
note, and defenses available to a maker.
Use of Parol Evidence in Suit on Promissory Note
Although parol evidence is generally not admissible to contradict or
vary the terms of a valid written contract," "when the consideration
underlying [a] note is at issue... 'the maker of a note, when sued, has
the right to show by parol, if he can, a want or failure of consideration.' "
However, admissibility of parol evidence under this exception appears to be conditioned on the absence of a merger clause or some
other statement in the note that it evidences the "entire agreement"
between the parties. 19 But, even if the promissory note contains a
merger or "entire agreement" clause, parol evidence may still be
admissible where the terms of the note are ambiguous. 95
A.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Hammock v. Bank South, 225 Ga. App. 225, 227, 483 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1997).
192. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-1 (1995).
193. Beasley v. Paul, 223 Ga. App. 706,709,478 S.E.2d 899,903 (1996) (quoting Craig
v. C & S Natl Bank, 142 Ga. App. 474, 475, 236 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1977)).
194. Id. at 710, 478 S.E.2d at 903. "[B]ecause none of these documents embodied the

parties' entire agreement, parol evidence was properly admitted. ... " Id.
195. See O.C.G.A. § 24-6-3 (1995).
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In Atha v. Atha,'" defendant executed the following handwritten
note: "I, [defendant] agree to pay [plaintiff] $22,000 at the time Able
Properties ...has secured financing from a financial institution. One
year from this date I agree to pay another $22,000 to [plaintiff] or to his
estate. " 1" Because the court found the emphasized language ambiguous, parol evidence was properly admissible.'
Yet another exception to the rule that parol evidence is generally
inadmissible in a suit to enforce a promissory note permits introduction
of parol evidence of "a separate and distinct, collateral oral agreement
that is consistent with and forms part of the consideration or inducement for a written agreement."' " However, application of this exception is subject to the presence of a sufficiently broad merger clause, so
that it will not apply where the parties expressly agree "to preclude
enforcement of any prior inducement not included in the written
contract" 2 °
B. Authority to Execute Note
A principal drafting consideration in the promissory note context is
ensuring that it is executed by someone with authority to do so. The
Equal Dignity Rule "° provides that "[wihere the exercise or performance of an agency is by written instrument, the agency shall also be
created by written instrument."20 However, "the 'legislature excepted
the creation of corporate agents from the equal dignity rule and ...
permitted corporations to create such agents in their usual mode of
transacting business--i.e. shareholder action in the adoption of charters,
by-laws, resolutions and similar conduct vesting corporate agents with
authority to act.'" 2° In Rohm & Haas Co. v. Gainesville Paint &
Supply Co.,' ° the court of appeals applied this rule to conclude that
the signatory on the guaranty sued upon did not have authority to
execute the same on behalf of the corporate defendant.' 5 In Gaines-

196. 224 Ga. App. 280, 480 S.E.2d 298 (1997).
197. Id. at 280, 480 S.E.2d at 298 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 281, 480 S.E.2d at 299.
199. Great Am. Builders, Inc. v. Howard, 207 Ga. App. 236, 240, 427 S.E.2d 588, 591
(1993).
200. Talmadge v. Respess, 224 Ga. App. 768, 770, 482 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1997).
201. O.C.G.A. § 10-6-2 (1994).
202. Id.
203. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Gainesville Paint & Supply Co., 225 Ga. App. 441, 442, 483
S.E.2d 888, 891 (1997) (quoting Whiteway Neon-Ad v. Opportunities Indus., 243 Ga. 114,
115, 252 S.E.2d 604, 605 (1979)).
204. 225 Ga. App. 441, 483 S.E.2d 888 (1997).
205. Id. at 442-43, 483 S.E.2d at 891.
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ville Paint,the name of the corporate defendant's president was signed
to the guaranty by another on his behalf.' e Notwithstanding testimony from the person who actually signed the president's name that she
did so at his direction (a contention denied by the president), the court
held the corporate defendant not liable on the guaranty." Specifically, the record was devoid of any evidence that defendant's president had
authority to verbally appoint agents or that it was the corporate
defendant's practice to verbally authorize persons to sign for its
principals.2' In the absence of such evidence, the corporate exception
to the equal dignity rule did not apply, and failure to establish written
authority
for the person who signed the guaranty was fatal to plaintiff's
2°
claim. 9
Another survey decision highlights the importance of correctly
indicating the capacity in which the note is to be executed by the maker.
"[Tihe form of the signature on the note ... governs the capacity in
which the signor executes the note."210 Defendants in Talmadge v.
Respess"1 appealed the trial court's ruling that they were liable in
their individual capacities. The note signed by defendants contained the
handwritten words "TWELVE OAKS REALITY" directly above
defendants' signatures, but neither signature indicated a representative
capacity.212 The court of appeals, applying former O.C.G.A section 113-403(2),213 which provides that the signor of a note is personally
obligated when his or her signature fails to indicate execution in a
representative capacity, affirmed the trial court.214
C. Attorney Fees
The payee of any promissory note will certainly want to include a
provision requiring payment of attorney fees in the event the note is
collected through an attorney. An obligation to pay attorney fees
contained in any note is enforceable under O.C.G.A. section 13-1_11,215
which requires that the party seeking enforcement thereof notify the
maker that it has ten days from receipt of such notice to pay the note to

206. Id. at 442, 483 S.E.2d at 891.,
207.

Id.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 443, 483 S.E.2d at 891.
Avery v. Whitworth, 202 Ga. App. 508, 509, 414 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1992).
224 Ga. App. 768, 482 S.E.2d 709 (1997).
Id. at 770, 482 S.E.2d at 712.
O.C.GA. § 11-3-403(2) (1994).
Id..
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a) (1982).
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avoid payment of attorney fees as well.21

In Talmadge v. Respess, the
court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument that this provision
requires a plaintiff to specify in its notice that the maker has "exactly
ten days." 1 The notice at issue in Talmadge had generously provided
defendant with twenty days in which to comply and avoid payment of
The court found this sufficiently complied with
attorney fees.21
section 13-1_11.29 The court in Rohm & Haas v. Gainesville Paint &

Supply Co. also ruled in favor of the maker on the attorney fees issue,
finding the liability limitation clause in the guaranty "d[id] not similarly
limit the amount paid for attorney fees," so that it was error for the trial
2
court to deny plaintiff summary judgment on the attorney fees issue. 1
D. Defenses
Both the D'Oench doctrine22 1 and 12 U.S.C. § 182321 preclude the
assertion of certain defenses by makers of notes given to banks. In
particular, 12 U.S.C. § 1823 prevents the maker of a note from asserting
"a defense based on any agreement that does not clearly appear in a
bank's records." 2' The court in Resiventure, Inc. v. National Loan
Investors2 refused to apply D'Oench or this statutory bar to a defense
by the maker that it had paid the note, stating that "since the payment
defense is independent of any side agreement, the trial court erred in
12 U.S.C. § 1823 and D'Oench to bar [defendant's] payment
applying 225
defense."
Defenses may also be waived, as demonstrated by Ramirez v.
Golden.225 In Ramirez, defendant executed an individual guaranty
regarding his corporation's purchase of a business. The guaranty was
applicable to "all renewals, amendments, extensions, consolidations, and
modifications of the loan documents" that were the subject of the
guaranty and also contained a clause waiving "any legal or equitable
defenses whatsoever to which guarantor might otherwise be enti-

216. Id.
217.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
214-15
224.
225.
226.

224 Ga. App. at 773, 482 S.E.2d at 713,

Id.
Id.
225 Ga. App. at 445, 483 S.E.2d at 893.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 .S. 447 (1942).
12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
Resiventure v. National Loan Investors, 224 Ga. App. 220, 222, 480 S.E.2d 212,
(1997) (citing Bufman Org. v. FDIC, 82 F.3d 1020, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996)).
224 Ga. App. 220, 480 S.E.2d 212 (1997).
Id. at 223, 480 S.E.2d at 215.
223 Ga. App. 610, 478 S.E.2d 430 (1996).
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tled." 7 The sale's closing documents also included a noncompete
agreement to be executed by plainiff-seller, which could be amended with
the prior consent of the purchasing corporation. Defendant-guarantor
subsequently sold his interest in the purchaser-corporation, which
thereafter released plaintiff-seller from his covenant not to compete. The
purchaser corporation then declared bankruptcy and defaulted on the
obligation for which the guaranty was given. In defense of plairitiff's
complaint against him on the guaranty, defendant claimed that release
of plaintiff from the covenant not to compete was a novation resulting
in defendant's release as a guarantor under O.C.G.A. section 10-7-21, or,
alternatively, was an act increasing the risk to him as a guarantor that
discharged him under O.C.G.A. section 10-7-22.2 2 However, because
defendant had consented in advance to waiver of all legal or equitable
defenses under the terms of the guaranty, he was precluded from raising
either novation or increased risk under O.C.G.A. sections 10-7-21 and
10-7-22, respectively. "[Tihe protection afforded by O.C.G.A. [sections]
10-7-21 and 10-7-22 can be waived in advance at the time a guarantor,
signs the instrument." 2
Lastly, a maker who executes a note for the admitted purpose of
delaying, hindering, or defrauding a potential creditor cannot thereafter
seek cancellation of the note. In Laxton v. Laxton,2 plaintiff-son gave
his defendant-father a note secured by a deed to his real property in an
attempt to avoid a potential judgment creditor. After the threat of a
judgment against him had disappeared, plaintiff-son filed suit against
defendant-father seeking to cancel the note and deed." The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's grant of directed verdict in favor of
defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff had unclean hands.3 2
V. CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Although the validity vel non of covenants not to compete within
employment contracts dominated this area of law, the courts addressed
other issues as well. One of the more interesting decisions outside the
covenant not to compete context was that real estate brokers have a
fiduciary obligation to their agents to compensate and protect an agent
during the broker-agent relationship. Moreover, a breach of this
fiduciary obligation by the broker will give the agent a cause of action

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 610, 478 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 610-11, 478 S.E.2d at 430-31 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 10-7-21, -22 (1994)).
Id. at 612, 478 S.E.2d at 431.
267 Ga. 591, 481 S.E.2d 227 (1997).
Id. at 591, 481 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 592, 481 S.E.2d at 228.
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for damages against the broker.28 In McLane v. Atlanta Market
Center Management Co.,2M defendant-real estate brokerage had an
exclusive agency agreement through October 11, 1992 with defendantproperty management company to lease certain commercial space.
Defendant-broker assigned the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games ("ACOG") as a potential tenant for this space, to its employee,
plaintiff-real estate agent. Under plaintiff's oral employment agreement
with defendant-broker, plaintiff was to receive a commission based on
square footage leased, and the sole condition precedent to entitlement to
commission was the execution of a lease and subsequent occupancy by
a tenant.236
On July 22, 1992, ACOG informed plaintiff of its need for a substantial amount of additional space, and plaintiff communicated this to
defendant-broker and defendant-property manager. On August 25, 1992,
defendant-property manager instructed defendant-broker and plaintiff
to have no further contact with ACOG and on October 19, 1992 informed
defendant-broker that no commission would be paid to it for leases not
executed by October 31, 1992. On October 31, 1992, defendant-broker
fired plaintiff, who rejected a severance package that would have
required her to forego her commission rights in the additional ACOG
space.23
Defendant-broker responded to plaintiffs rejection of the severance
package with assurances that it would continue to press for plaintiffs
commission rights in its dealings with defendant-property manager and
if successful it would pay plaintiff her commission on the ACOG space.
Defendant-broker and defendant-property manager then settled the
dispute: defendant-broker would receive leasing rights to other facilities
owned by defendant-property manager in exchange for a stipulation that
all commissions were paid under the prior agreement and that defendant-broker would hold harmless defendant-property manager from any
commissions claimed by defendant-broker's employees. ACOG eventually leased the additional space on February 18, 1993. An internal memo
from defendant-broker suggested withholding plaintiffs commissions on
an unrelated matter until a settlement could be reached with her on the
ACOG deal. 7

233.
(1997).
234.
235.
236.
237.

McLane v. Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Management Co., 225 Ga. App. 818, 486 S.E.2d 30

Id.
Id. at 819-20, 486 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 820-21, 486 S.E.2d at 33.
Id. at 821-22, 486 S.E.2d at 33-34.
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As previously noted, the court of appeals held that plaintiff had a
cause of action against defendant-broker for breach of fiduciary
duty."' The fiduciary nature of the broker-agent relationship imposed
on the broker a duty not to usurp a business opportunity arising from
that relationship."' Moreover, the following evidence was sufficient
to create a question for the jury on whether defendant-broker had
breached its fiduciary obligation: (1) defendant-broker's letter to
plaintiff that it would continue to press for plaintiff's commission rights,
(2) the settlement with defendant-property manager less than three
weeks after such assurances without regard to plaintiff's rights, and (3)
the internal memo suggesting retention of plaintiff's commission on an
unrelated matter pending settlement with her over the ACOG deal.'
A.

The Contractof Employment, Generally
An essential element of an employment contract is the amount of
compensation to be paid, which must be stated with sufficient definiteness.2 41 In Carter v. Hubbard,s' 2 the court of appeals applied this
rule to a contract of employment that, although assumed by the court to
be for a five-year term, was declared unenforceable beyond the first

238. Id. at 825, 486 S.E.2d at 36.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 825-26, 486 S.E,2d at 36-37. Plaintiff also filed a civil conspiracy claim
against defendant-property manager. "A conspiracy is a combination to accomplish an
unlawful end, or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means." Id. at 826, 486 S.E.2d
at 37. Plaintiff also alleged a cause of action against defendant-property manager for
malicious interference with contractual rights, the elements of which are as follows: "(1)
an independent wrongful act of interference by a stranger to the contract; (2) malicious
intent to cause injury; and (3) resulting damage." Id. at 827, 486 S.E.2d at 37. The same
set of facts that enabled plaintiffs claim against the broker for breach of fiduciary duty
similarly precluded entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant-property manager
on the claims against it for civil conspiracy and for maliciously interfering with plaintiffs
right to compensation under its employment contract with defendant-broker. Id. at 826-28,
486 S.E.2d 36-38.
In contrast to her claim against defendant-property manager for malicious interference
with her right to compensation under her contract with defendant-broker, plaintiff also
included a second malicious interference claim as to her right to procurea lease under her
contract with defendant-broker. Because defendant-property manager (1) took over lease
negotiations with ACOG after learning of its request for additional space from plaintiff; (2)
prohibited plaintiff from having further contact with ACOG; and (3) delayed execution of
the lease with ACOG to avoid payment of plaintiffs commission, a jury issue existed
whether plaintiff had stated a claim for malicious interference as to her right to "procure
a lease" under her contract with defendant-broker. Id.
241. Sawyer v. Roberts, 208 Ga. App. 870, 871, 432 S.E.2d 610, 611 (1993).
242. 224 Ga. App. 375, 480 S.E.2d 382 (1997).
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year.
Because the contract of employment contained only compensation for the first year, it was unenforceable beyond that time notwithstanding the five-year term.244
24
In Marcre Sales Corp. v. Jetter,

the court of appeals refused to

imply in a contract of employment a provision permitting termination for
cause.2 46 The employment contract between employer and employee
provided for automatic renewals for twelve-month periods and permitted
employer to terminate only by giving notice towards the end of a twelvemonth term. Although earlier drafts had contained a provision allowing
termination for cause, the final agreement did not. 247
After employer fired employee during the middle of a twelve-month
term, employer sued employee to enforce the covenant not to compete in
the employment agreement. Employee counterclaimed for wrongful
termination.24 The court of appeals, in upholding the trial court's
decision granting the employee summary judgment on his wrongful
termination counterclaim, said it could not locate "any authority
supporting [employer's] proposition that a termination for cause

provision was intended by the parties."249

As a last note under general employment contract matters, the court
of appeals reiterated that "personnel manuals stating that employees can
be terminated only for cause and setting forth termination procedures
are not contracts of employment; failure to follow the termination
procedures
contained in them is not actionable [as a breach of con2
tract." 6

B. Covenants Not to Compete
Attempting a rational synthesis of Georgia law on covenants not to
compete is simply impossible. Decisions litter the Georgia Reports that,
when read together, provide little if any guidance on whether a covenant
will be enforceable. This is perhaps because of the fact sensitive nature

243. Id. at 378, 480 S.E.2d at 385.
244. Id. at 377-78, 480 S.E.2d at 384-85.
245. 223 Ga. App. 70, 476 S.E.2d 840 (1996).
246. Id. at 72, 476 S.E.2d at 842.
247. Id.
248. Id at 70, 476 S.E.2d at 841.
249. Id. at 72, 476 S.E.2d at 842.
250. Jones v. Chatham County, 223 Ga. App. 455, 459, 477 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1996).
However, this statement is only applicable to causes of action alleging a breach of contract
on the basis of a policy manual. Id. A public employee may nevertheless have a cause of
action for a violation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a governmental
employer's failure to follow the procedures outlined in a personnel manual. Id. See also
Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359 (1975).
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of the decisions. Nevertheless, a court will generally enforce a covenant
not to compete in an employment contract if it is "reasonable in terms
of duration, territorial coverage, and the scope of activity precluded,
considering the legitimate business interests the employer seeks to
protect and the effect on the employee." 51 Of course, this merely begs
the question of what will be deemed "reasonable" in addition to the
three-element test of duration, territorial coverage, and scope of
precluded activity. A court should consider "the nature and extent of the
trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all other relevant
circumstances" in making the reasonableness determination. 52
In Chaichimansour v. Pets are People Too,253 the court of appeals
provided some insight on the interrelationship of several of these
considerations.
Defendant-veterinarian challenged a noncompete
covenant as overbroad because it prevented her from serving clients
whom she had never served or had contact with while employed by
plaintiff. In support of her argument, defendant relied on Darugarv.
Hodges2' and Vortex Protective Service v. Dempsey255 for the proposition that a covenant not to compete is overbroad in the scope of activity
precluded, and thus unreasonable, when it prevents competition with
respect to clients with whom she did not deal while employed by
W6

plaintiff.

In distinguishing Darugarand Vortex, the court of appeals referred to
the supreme court's decision in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal,5 7 upon
which the holding in both cases had been based. 28" The court found as
follows:
[W.R. Grace] focused on the interplay between the territorial limitation
and the scope of the prohibition: if the scope of prohibited behavior is

narrow enough (e.g., contacting those with whom the employee dealt
while working for the employer), the covenant may be reasonable even
if it has no territorial limitations or has a territorial limitation which
is very broad. But if the scope of the prohibition is broader, the

251. Chaichimansour v. Pets Are People Too, 226 Ga. App. 69, 70,485 S.E.2d 248,249
(1997).
252. Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585, 484 S.E.2d
323, 325 (1997).
253. 226 Ga. App. 69, 485 S.E.2d 248 (1997).
254. 221 Ga. App. 227, 471 S.E.2d 33 (1996).
255. 218 Ga. App. 763, 463 S.E.2d 67 (1995).
256. 226 Ga. App. at 70, 485 S.E.2d at 250.
257. 262 Ga. 464, 422 S.E.2d 529 (1992).
258. 226 Ga. at 70-71, 485 S.E.2d at 250.
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territorial limitation must be specified and closely tied to the area in
which the employee actually worked. 9
The court of appeals disapproved Darugarand Vortex to the extent those
decisions implied that "prohibitions on competition with respect to
customers or potential customers beyond those with whom the employee
dealt during his employment will always be unreasonable, even if in a
specified and reasonable geographic area."2®
Although not discussing the relationship between territorial coverage
and the scope of the prohibition, the court of appeals decision, in DelliGatti v. Mansfield26 did elaborate upon the circumstances to be
considered in deciding whether the scope of activity precluded is
overbroad in the medical services context. In Mansfield, plaintiffemployee challenged the following covenant not to compete as unenforceable: "'[plaintiff] ... covenants that she shall not provide pediatric
services or other medical care as a physician within Upson County or
provide said services at the Upson Regional Medical Center for twelve
(12) months immediately following the said termination.' 2 62 In
finding the scope of the prohibited activity reasonable, the court of
appeals noted that the breadth of the scope of the activity prohibited-"other medical care as a physician"--did not operate to prevent
plaintiff from earning a living (except in Upson County for twelve
months); did not prevent him from practicing medicine (except in Upson
County); and, moreover, the clause challenged by plaintiff as overbroad
was not the portion preventing him from doing what he wanted, which
was to practice pediatrics."
The court of appeals also assessed the reasonableness of a territorial
limitation defined by reference to the employee's territory in Sysco Food
Services of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp.' 4 An issue in Chupp was the
following "agreement not to compete:"
Employee covenants and agrees that during employment by the
company and for a period of one year after termination of such
employment for any reason, employee will not, without prior written
consent of the company, directly or indirectly within the territory, (a)
for himself, (b) as a consultant, manager, supervisor, employee or
owner of a competing business, or (c) as an independent contractor for
a competing business, engage in any business in which employee

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 71, 485 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 71-72, 485 S.E.2d at 250.
223 Ga. App. 76, 477 S.E.2d 134 (1996).
Id. at 77, 477 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 79, 477 S.E.2d at 137.
225 Ga. App. 584, 484 S.E.2d 323 (1997).
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provides services which are the same or substantially similar to

employee's duties for [employer] as described in this agreement and its
incorporated exhibits.2"
"Territory" was separately defined to include numerous counties in
which defendant-employee had been initially assigned.'"
The court of appeals, finding that both the scope of activities
prohibited and the one year duration were reasonable, turned to the
territorial limitation. 7 The trial court had found the territorial
limitation overbroad because it applied to counties in which defendant
had formerly (but no longer) worked. 2 The court of appeals disagreed
and found the territorial restriction reasonable because it undisputedly
included "only territory in which [defendant] had actually performed
work for [plaintiff]." 9 However, the court of appeals seemed to
qualify its ruling by reference to the fact that within the past eighteen
months, defendant had worked in the territory covered by the covenant
not to compete. 270 That apparent qualification suggests that if territo-

rial limitations defined similar to the one at issue in Chupp are not
periodically amended, they may become overbroad by prohibiting
competition in an area where the employee has not worked for several
years.
VI. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
The survey period produced a number of decisions regarding the use
of various clauses in commercial agreements.
Litigation Oriented Clauses
Although most lawyers would contend that every clause in an
agreement is "litigation-oriented," some, such as forum selection and
choice of law provisions, are more so than others. The court of appeals
reminds us in Central Ohio Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Capital Resource,
Inc.271 that limitations do exist on the breadth of forum selection
clauses. At issue in Central Ohio was the following forum selection
clause: "'[Plaintiff] has the option of pursuing any action under this
agreement in any court of competent jurisdiction and the customer
A.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 584, 484 S.E.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 585-86, 484 S.E.2d at 325.
Id. at 586, 484 S.E.2d at 325.
Id.
See id. at 586-87, 484 S.E.2d at 325-26.
221 Ga. App. 434, 472 S.E.2d 2 (1996).
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[defendant] consents to jurisdiction in the state -of our choice.' 272
Although the general rule is that "contractual clauses providing advance
consent to the jurisdiction of a court which would not otherwise have
personal jurisdiction are valid and enforceable in this state," the court
of appeals found this particular clause unenforceable. 273 First, the
"clause provide[d] no intimation of the forum contemplated," and as such
failed "to reflect a meeting of the minds sufficient to show [that] the
parties reached an agreement on the forum." 74 Second, the clause's
"lack of specificity impugns a fundamental purpose of such clauses: to
eliminate uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to
both parties."2 75 Because the clause would have permitted plaintiff "to
bring this action in any State in the country," it was unreasonable and
hence unenforceable.27 Apparently, either of these rationales would
have alone been sufficient to invalidate this forum selection clause.
In Antec Corp. v. Popcorn Channel, L.P,277 the court of appeals
addressed several issues relating to the following forum selection clauses
contained in a development agreement and a sales agreement:
[T]he construction and interpretation of this agreement shall at all
times and in all respects be governed by the laws of the State of New
York not including its conflict and choice of laws provisions. The
parties agree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction and
venue of the courts of the state of New York .... These terms and
conditions shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the
laws of the State of New York, excluding its choice of laws rules. The
parties hereby agree that any dispute regarding the interpretation or
validity of, or otherwise arising out of, these terms and conditions, or
relating to the Products sold or licensed hereunder shall be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the New York state and federal courts. 8
The court of appeals framed its analysis in light of the rule announced
in Brinson v. Martin:27 9 "[Wihere no Georgia law specifically governs
venue, and where more than one state and its citizens are involved,
'[forum selection] clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 434, 472 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 435, 472 S.E.2d at 3-4.
Id., 472 S.E.2d at 4.
Id.
Id. at 436, 472 S.E.2d at 4.
225 Ga. App. 1, 482 S.E.2d 509 (1997).
Id. at 1-2, 482 S.E.2d at 510.
220 Ga. App. 638, 469 S.E.2d 537 (1996).
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unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be "unreasonable"
under the circumstances."' °
The "resisting party" in Antec failed to carry its burden of showing the
clauses to be unreasonable under the circumstances."8 ' That "the
contracts were negotiated, signed, and substantially performed in
Georgia" did not make litigation in a foreign forum (New York)
inconvenient. 2s The resisting party was "aware of these considerations" when it agreed to the foreign venue, and there was no indication
of inequality of bargaining positions.2m
However, the court of appeals did find that the trial court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's entire complaint, which contained causes of action
arising out of contracts separate and distinct from those containing the
In so holding, the court of appeals restricforum selection clauses.'
tively interpreted the decision in Brinson, in which the court held that
"'because the claims against the other defendants arose directly or
indirectly from a single contract connecting the plaintiffs with all the
defendants, the other defendants were transaction participants entitled
But the court of appeals
to rely on the forum selection clause.'"
noted that to the extent that subsequent discovery revealed plaintiff's
additional claims to have arisen from the development and sales
agreements, dismissal would be appropriate.'
Choice of law contractual provisions often go hand in hand with forum
selection clauses. In Young v. W.S. Badcock Corp.,287 plaintiff and
defendant were parties to a dealership agreement containing the
following choice of law provision: "This Agreement and the terms hereof
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
After plaintiff terminated the agreement accordState of Florida."'
ing to its provisions, defendant informed plaintiff of the sum of money
it was entitled to receive. Plaintiff filed a tort claim against defendant
Because the choice of law
alleging that the sum due was greater.'
provision did "not state that any and all claims arising out of the

280. 225 Ga. App. at 2, 482 S.E.2d at 510 (quoting Brinson, 220 Ga. App. at 639, 469
S.E.2d at 538-39).
281. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 510-11.
282. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 511.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 3, 482 S.E.2d at 511.
285. Id at 2-3, 482 S.E.2d at 511 (emphasis added) (quoting Brinson, 220 Ga. App. at
640, 469 S.E.2d at 539).
286. Id. at 3, 482 S.E.2d at 511.
287. 222 Ga. App. 218, 474 S.E.2d 87 (1996).
288. Id. at 218-19, 474 S.E.2d at 88.
289. Id. at 218, 474 S.E.2d at 88.
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relationship between the parties shall be governed by Florida law," the
court of appeals held that "the provision [was] not applicable in
determining whether plaintiffs had set forth a valid tort claim."' The
lesson from Young is obvious: choice of law provisions should state that
in addition to governing the agreement itself, the chosen state's law will
govern "any and all claims" arising from the parties' relationship.
As a final note on litigation-oriented clauses, an attempt to determine
a court's subject matter jurisdiction by contract remains a vain
endeavor.29'
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
For those attorneys who count health clubs among their clients, the
court of appeals validated the use of an exculpatory clause in a
membership agreement that required members to: (1) assume any risk
occasioned by the use of the facilities and (2) forever release and
discharge the corporate owner of the club and any affiliated companies
and/or its agents and employees from liability for claims arising out of
the use of the facilities.'

290. Id. at 219, 474 S.E.2d at 88 (emphasis added).
291. See Bradley v. British Fitting Group, PLC, 221 Ga. App. 621,622,472 S.E.2d 146,
149 (1996).
292. Hembree v. Johnson, 224 Ga. App. 680, 680-81, 482 S.E.2d 407, 408-09 (1997).

